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Many typical symptoms of borderline personality disorder (BPD) occur within
interpersonal contexts, suggesting that BPD is characterized by aberrant social cognition.
While research consistently shows that BPD patients have biases in mental state
attribution (e.g., evaluate others as malevolent), the research focusing on accuracy in
inferring mental states (i.e., cognitive empathy) is less consistent. For complex and
ecologically valid tasks in particular, emerging evidence suggests that individuals with
BPD have impairments in the attribution of emotions, thoughts, and intentions of others
(e.g., Preißler et al., 2010). A history of childhood trauma and co-morbid PTSD seem to
be strong additional predictors for cognitive empathy deficits. Together with reduced
emotional empathy and aberrant sending of social signals (e.g., expression of mixed
and hard-to-read emotions), the deficits in mental state attribution might contribute to
behavioral problems in BPD. Given the importance of social cognition on the part of both
the sender and the recipient in maintaining interpersonal relationships and therapeutic
alliance, these impairments deserve more attention.
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Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is a
severe psychiatric condition characterized by a
pervasive pattern of marked impulsivity and
instability in affects, self-image and interper-
sonal relationships (APA, 2000). BPD affects
1–3% of the general adult population (Trull
et al., 2010) and 10% of psychiatric out-patients,
as well as 20% of in-patients (Korzekwa et al.,
2008). BPD is therefore a prominent clinical
disorder in psychiatric contexts.
Empirical research on BPD has thus
far mostly focused on affective instability.
Although affective instability has been well
established as a core symptom of BPD, it is
not specific to the disorder and does not solely
explain it, as it is a common characteristic in
other psychiatric conditions [e.g., depressive-
and bipolar-spectrum conditions, and posttrau-
matic stress disorder (PTSD), see Koenigsberg,
2010]. There are a number of prominent
symptoms of BPD—including repetitive suici-
dal behavior, self-injury, aggressive outbursts,
and increased emotional reactivity—that typ-
ically manifest themselves in an interpersonal
context. This supports the idea of a superordi-
nate deficit in the perception, processing and
emission of social signals (Stiglmayr et al.,
2005; Brodsky et al., 2006; Gunderson and
Lyons-Ruth, 2008).
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Although disturbed interpersonal function-
ing has been acknowledged since the early
Affective instability
High intensity of affective states, rapid
shifting between affect-categories, high
reactivity to social stimuli, slow return
to emotional baseline.
Social signals
Consciously or unconsciously perceived
and expressed signals during social
interaction such as, facial expression,
gesture, body posture, eye gaze, speech.
descriptions of BPD (Stern, 1938; Kernberg,
1967), it is only within the last decade that
research has focused more closely on the behav-
ioral and neural underpinnings of this aspect of
the disorder (e.g., Hill et al., 2008; King-Casas
et al., 2008; Seres et al., 2009; Ruocco et al., 2010)
and now supports the notion that the relational
style of BPD patients might be more specific to
the disorder than affective instability or impul-
sivity (Gunderson, 2007). The exchange of social
signals that is the basis for social cognition
could be a key factor in understanding the char-
Social cognition
Sum of cognitive processes that allow
humans to interact with one another,
substantially depending upon the
exchange of social signals.
acteristic relational style in BPD. This article
aims to review the current status of research on
the processes of social cognition in patients with
BPD.
SOCIAL COGNITION
Social interaction involves bi-directional pro-
cesses: individuals are emitters and recipients
of social signals. The function of adequately
perceiving and processing social signals (con-
sciously or unconsciously) has been referred to
as social cognition (c.f., Adolphs, 1999; Frith
and Frith, 2007). The outcome of this process
depends upon the interpretation of social sig-
nals emitted during the encounter, including
not only language (content and tone), but also
facial expression and body gestures. Moreover,
the ability to adequately process social signals is
a prerequisite for consciously or unconsciously
generating appropriate responses. Thus, social
cognitive skills are necessary for successful social
interactions and they allow humans to establish
and maintain, short- and long-term relation-
ships with significant others.
A construct that captures a wide range of
social cognition processes is empathy. There
is broad agreement that empathy comprises at
least two components (Singer, 2006; Decety and
Meyer, 2008). The first is a cognitive compo-
nent, which captures the capacity to infer others’
mental states and is also referred to as per-
spective taking, mentalizing, or (affective and
cognitive) theory of mind (Blair, 2005). Second,
empathy also comprises an affective component,
i.e., an emotional response to another person’s
emotional state (Davis, 1994; Blair, 2005).
In the following, we review literature that
provides data on BPD patients as recipients
and emitters of social signals. With regard to
BPD patients as recipients of social signals,
we focus on the ability for cognitive empa-
thy and emotional empathy. With respect to
Cognitive empathy
Ability to understand the mental states
of others, i.e., their thoughts, desires,
beliefs, intentions, and knowledge, also
referred to as perspective taking,
mentalizing, or theory of mind.
Emotional empathy
Ability to share the emotional state of
another person, emotional reaction in
an observer to the affective state of
another individual. BPD patients as emitters of social signals, we
focus on studies of facial emotion expression.
In addition, we present new approaches that
use economic exchange games to mimic the
bi-directional process of social exchange (e.g.,
King-Casas et al., 2008).
COGNITIVE EMPATHY IN BPD
A variety of different study designs have been
utilized to assess cognitive empathy in BPD.
These studies have focused on accuracy or biases
of mental state attribution, using self- and other
reports, as well as behavioral and neuroimaging
tasks.
Early psychoanalytic studies used Rorschach
responses to investigate general ability and
biases in cognitive empathy in BPD patients
(e.g., Lerner and St. Peter, 1984; Stuart
et al., 1990; for review see Westen, 1990). In
summary, borderline patients showed more
malevolent and idiosyncratic, yet cognitive-
developmentally advanced representations
of people’s intentions on the Rorschach test.
Additional research on biases using projective
material from the Thematic Apperception Test
and other narratives (Westen, 1990, 1991a,b;
Westen et al., 1990a,b,c,d; Nigg et al., 1992; Segal
et al., 1992, 1993) further indicated that BPD
patients were able to make complex intentional
attributions of other people’s actions. However,
BPD patients expressed more malevolent rep-
resentations of others compared to the control
groups of non-BPD patients and non-clinical
participants. A study by Arntz and Veen (2001),
however, found evidence for less complexity
in BPD patients’, but also cluster C personality
disorder patients’, character descriptions after
watching emotional and non-emotional film
sequences compared to non-clinical controls.
A further study (Veen and Arntz, 2000) used
short video clips from commercial movies
to assess biases and found that BPD patients
(compared to cluster C personality disorder
patients and non-clinical controls) made more
extreme evaluations (i.e., multidimensional
dichotomous thinking) of actors in film clips
addressing BPD specific themes, but not in
control film clips. Another study by the same
group (Arntz and ten Haaf, 2012) evaluated
telephone discussions on real negative events
of BPD patients and control groups, with
professionals taking an accepting, rejecting
or neutral stance. BPD patients showed no
significant difference in complexity of under-
standing of others but displayed a more extreme
evaluation (i.e., multidimensional dichotomous
thinking) of the professionals in all three
conditions compared to cluster C personality
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disorder patients and non-clinical participants.
Further, Barnow et al. (2009) conducted a study
on interpretation biases by presenting short
silent film clips of characters entering a room
and taking a seat. BPD patients evaluated the
characters in the film as more negative and
more aggressive compared to depressed and
non-clinical controls. Furthermore, studies
using self-report questionnaires to assess biases
found that BPD patients had a tendency to
assume that “the world and others are danger-
ous and malevolent” (Pretzer, 1990; Arntz et al.,
2004).
Using self-report measures on ability of cog-
nitive empathy, Guttman and Laporte (2000)
found perspective taking, as assessed with
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis,
1983), to be impaired in BPD patients com-
pared to patients with anorexia nervosa and
non-clinical controls. Harari et al. (2010) and
New et al. (2012) replicated this finding on the
IRI perspective taking scale in BPD patients
compared to non-clinical controls. Fonagy et al.
(1996) used a clinical interview in the style
of the Adult Attachment Interview (de Haas
et al., 1994) and found further evidence that
BPD patients had deficits in understanding the
mental states of others compared to a clinical
non-BPD control group.
Clinical observations (Krohn, 1974; Carter
and Rinsley, 1977) and early empirical stud-
ies focusing on accuracy in inferring others’
emotional states (Frank and Hoffman, 1986;
Ladisich and Feil, 1988) gave rise to the descrip-
tive term “borderline empathy”, which refers to
enhanced cognitive empathy in BPD. A study
by Frank and Hoffman (1986) analyzed the
ability of BPD patients to infer the emotional
states of others compared to non-BPD patients.
Participants had to choose one of two alternative
affective descriptions after watching a 10-min
video sequence containing depictions of dif-
ferent emotional situations, each portrayed by
the same female actor. The borderline group
showed significantly fewer errors and was more
sensitive to nonverbal communication than the
control group, thus indicating increased cogni-
tive empathy in BPD. Ladisich and Feil (1988)
measured how well a particular member of an
interacting group predicted the self-rated feel-
ings of the other group members. BPD patients
achieved higher scores compared to non-BPD
patients but did not differ from the psychiatrist’s
ratings, which served as further argument for
increased cognitive empathy in BPD. Flury et al.
(2008) used a comparable study design includ-
ing participants with high and low BPD traits. In
the first step, the authors replicated the results of
Ladisich and Feil (1988), with individuals with
high BPD traits showing enhanced accuracy in
attributing mental states (thoughts and feelings)
to others. In a second step, however, reanalysis of
the data revealed that these effects were a conse-
quence of the participants with high BPD traits
having more unusual, harder-to-predict person-
alities, and thoughts and feelings that were dif-
ficult to infer compared to their counterparts
with low BPD traits. This led to lower accuracy
scores in the participants with low BPD traits
(Flury et al., 2008). The authors concluded that
the difference in accuracy between individuals
with low and high BPD traits was not related to
a difference in performance but to the difficulty
in reading high BPD trait participants. Thus,
this study presented a first hint that emission of
social signals might be abnormal in BPD.
Most recent studies on accuracy in cognitive
empathy in BPD have used facial emotion recog-
nition tasks (e.g., by using static images, such as
Ekman faces or morphed facial pictures; Lynch
et al., 2006; Domes et al., 2008; for review see
Domes et al., 2009). The results of these studies
have not been entirely consistent. In some stud-
ies, patients with BPD correctly identified emo-
tional facial expressions (Wagner and Linehan,
1999), at times even more accurately than non-
clinical controls (Lynch et al., 2006). Although
Wagner and Linehan (1999) found that neutral
facial expressions were interpreted more nega-
tively by BPD patients compared to non-clinical
controls. Domes et al. (2008) examined the rat-
ings of pictures of faces displaying two basic
emotions at the same time (i.e., blends). BPD
patients showed a bias toward the perception
of anger in comparison to non-clinical controls.
Interestingly, when facial emotion recognition
tasks approximate more complex and naturalis-
tic situations [e.g., by setting time limits for rec-
ognizing emotions in faces (Dyck et al., 2009),
or by providing additional prosodic information
(Minzenberg et al., 2006)], patients with BPD
show increased error rates compared to non-
clinical controls. Thus, these findings might
indicate that BPD patients show impairments
in cognitive empathy mainly on tasks that are
complex or more ecologically valid.
In a study using the “Reading the Mind
in the Eyes” (RME; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001)
test that focuses on accuracy of inferring emo-
tional states by presenting photographs of eye
regions, Schilling et al. (2012) could not detect
any deficits in mental state attribution in BPD
patients compared to non-clinical controls. In
contrast, Fertuck et al. (2009) found enhanced
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“mindreading” capacities with the RME test
in BPD patients compared to non-clinical
controls.
Using the “Faux pas” task that focuses on
accuracy of inferring thoughts and intentions,
Harari et al. (2010) found theory of mind to
be impaired in BPD patients compared to non-
clinical controls. In the “Faux pas” task (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997) 20 stories with interactions
between speaker and listener are presented and
the participant is asked to detect a faux pas in
each story. Arntz et al. (2009) also focused on
accuracy in mental state inferences and could
not find deficits in theory of mind capacities
in BPD patients compared to non-clinical con-
trols when using the “strange stories” task; how-
ever, BPD patients scored significantly lower
than cluster C personality disorder patients. The
“strange stories” task (an advanced Theory of
Mind task, Happé, 1994) includes stories involv-
ing bluffs, mistakes, white lies, and persuasion in
addition to non-mental state stories as a control
condition. After listening to the stories, partici-
pants are asked questions about the characters’
intentions. Furthermore, Ghiassi et al. (2010)
did not find deficits in understanding others’
minds in BPD patients compared to non-clinical
controls in a study using a cartoon task that also
focuses on accurately inferring thoughts and
intentions. In the cartoon task (Brüne, 2005),
cartoon pictures with stories of cooperation,
cheating, and cooperation at the cost of a third
person have to be ordered in a logical sequence.
In sum, studies on accuracy in cognitive
empathy in BPD have not produced consistent
results. One limitation of prior study designs is
the lack of ecological validity, given that BPD
patients only seem to show deficits in cognitive
empathy in tasks using more complex or eco-
logically valid material (Minzenberg et al., 2006;
Dyck et al., 2009).
In response to the critique of stimulus
material with low ecological validity, Dziobek
and colleagues developed the “Movie for
the Assessment of Social Cognition” (MASC;
Dziobek et al., 2006; Hassenstab et al., 2007).
The MASC is video-based and displays social
interactions among multiple characters, thus
including social signals such as language, ges-
ture, posture, and facial expression. It assesses
the participant’s recognition of the characters’
mental states in an everyday life context and
thus allows for the analysis of cognitive empathy
in a more ecologically valid manner than tra-
ditional tests. In the movie, four people spend
an evening together having dinner. Dominant
interaction topics include dating and friendship.
Given that patients with BPD show defining
social abnormalities with respect to friendship
and romantic relationships, the MASCmight be
specifically sensitive to social cognitive dysfunc-
tions. The 15-min film is paused at 45 points
when questions concerning the characters’ feel-
ings, thoughts, and intentions are asked (e.g.,
“What is Betty feeling?,” “What is Cliff think-
ing?,” and “Why is Michael doing this?”).
A recent study by Preißler et al. (2010)
assessed cognitive empathy using theMASC and
the RME task in 64 women diagnosed with
BPD, and 38 non-clinical female comparison
subjects matched in age and IQ. Whereas the
RME task failed to detect significant impair-
ments in social cognition in patients with BPD,
the more ecologically valid MASC clearly iden-
tified differences. Patients with BPD showed
impaired recognition of the feelings, thoughts,
and intentions of the starring movie characters.
The results of this study support the notion that
BPD patients have deficits in cognitive empa-
thy in more ecologically valid tasks. A limi-
tation of this study might be that the MASC
focuses on dating and friendship issues. Thus,
it cannot be ruled out that this deficit is con-
text specific and does not apply to other social
situations.
In another study, applying the MASC in ado-
lescents with BPD traits, Sharp et al. (2011) also
found evidence for impaired cognitive empa-
thy in individuals high in borderline traits in
comparison to individuals low in borderline
traits. Moreover, cognitive empathy correlated
with self-report measures of emotion regula-
tion. These results indicate that high arousal or
emotional states might interfere with cognitive
empathy ability (Sharp et al., 2011).
Another study by Dziobek et al. (2011)
further assessed cognitive empathy in BPD
using the Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET;
Dziobek et al., 2008). The MET is consid-
ered a more ecologically valid measure than
self-report instruments or text-based tasks, and
it has the additional benefit of allowing for
the separate assessment of cognitive and emo-
tional aspects of empathy. The test consists
of photographs depicting people in emotion-
ally charged situations and is intended to pro-
duce strong emotional reactions. To assess
cognitive empathy, participants were required
to infer the emotion of the subject in the
photo and were asked to indicate the correct
one from a list of four. This study replicated
the finding of a deficit in cognitive empa-
thy in patients with BPD (Dziobek et al.,
2011).
Frontiers in Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2013 | Volume 6 | Article 195 | 4
Roepke et al. Social cognition in borderline personality disorder
IMPACT OF CHILDHOOD MALTREATMENT AND
TRAUMA ON COGNITIVE EMPATHY IN BPD
Prior research has indicated that childhood mal-
treatment has a negative impact on different
aspects of social cognition in non-clinical indi-
viduals (Smith and Walden, 1999; Cicchetti
et al., 2003; Pears and Fisher, 2005).
Although Ghiassi et al. (2010) did not find
that BPD patients had deficits in understanding
others’ minds using a cartoon task, self-reported
negative maternal behavior was a negative pre-
dictor for cognitive empathy later in adult-
hood, indicating the negative influence of early
stressors.
Furthermore, the results by Preißler et al.
(2010) provided preliminary evidence that sex-
ual assault by a known assailant, which was
reported by 58% of patients, is associated with
impaired mental state attribution. These find-
ings are of special interest as BPD is associ-
ated with high rates of childhood maltreatment
(Zanarini, 2000). Physical abuse or neglect,
and especially sexual abuse are specific envi-
ronmental risk factors for developing BPD
(Johnson et al., 1999; Lobbestael et al., 2010).
Furthermore, BPD patients report more types of
abuse in childhood, beginning earlier in life and
repeated over longer periods of time than com-
parison groups (Zanarini et al., 1997). The study
by Preißler et al. (2010) found that only 46%
of BPD patients who reported sexual assault by
a known assailant developed comorbid PTSD.
Thus, this type of trauma seems to be associated
with impairment in cognitive empathy in BPD
patients even in the absence of the full clinical
picture of comorbid PTSD.
At the same time, PTSD is a prevalent comor-
bidity of BPD as it is present in up to 56%
of patients (e.g., Zanarini et al., 1998). This
high percentage of full symptom PTSD, but
also the frequent subclinical PTSD (Harned
et al., 2010) is reflected in, among other symp-
toms, the severe intrusions that many BPD
patients suffer from. Preliminary evidence from
studies using facial emotion recognition tasks
showed that intrusive symptoms and comor-
bid PTSD are negative predictors for emo-
tion recognition abilities in BPD (Dyck et al.,
2009). Preißler et al. (2010) also identified intru-
sive symptoms and comorbid PTSD in their
study as factors contributing to impaired cog-
nitive empathy in BPD. However, further stud-
ies are needed to assess more precisely the
impact of trauma, trauma type and comor-
bid PTSD on cognitive empathy in BPD
and, most importantly, to identify underlying
mechanisms.
In sum, studies on bias in cognitive empathy
in BPD point toward a generally differentiated
but negative and malevolent perception of oth-
ers, especially if borderline-specific themes are
addressed (e.g., rejection, exclusion, and abuse).
Further, BPD patients might be characterized
by a bias toward a generally more extreme
evaluation of others. Studies using self-report
measures indicate that BPD patients themselves
perceive a deficit in cognitive empathy. Studies
on accuracy of cognitive empathy in BPD seem
to indicate an impaired ability, especially in
patients with comorbid PTSD or a history of
sexual abuse. These deficits in accuracy are sub-
tle, might depend on context, and are more
likely to be detected with ecologically valid tasks.
NEUROFUNCTIONAL CORRELATES OF COGNITIVE
EMPATHY IN BPD
Recent data have provided initial evidence
for alterations in brain function that might
underlie deficits in cognitive empathy in BPD.
Dziobek et al. (2011) used a functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) adaptation of the
MET (Dziobek et al., 2008) and compared 30
un-medicated women with BPD and 29 female
non-clinical controls. Brain responses during
cognitive empathy were significantly reduced
in BPD patients compared to controls in a
region comprising the left superior temporal
sulcus and gyrus (STS/STG). In line with these
findings, a recent study by Mier et al. (2012)
also found reduced activation of the STS/STG
along with the inferior frontal gyrus during
the attribution of intentions compared to non-
clinical controls in a cognitive empathy task. The
STS/STG is known for its role in social cog-
nition and is an important part of the neural
network that mediates thinking about others
(Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Bahnemann et al.,
2010). Interestingly, reduction of STS/STG acti-
vation in the study by Dziobek et al. (2011)
was associated with levels of intrusive symp-
tomatology in the BPD group: those individuals
showing particularly low levels of activation
in the STS/STG region reported high levels of
recurring traumatic memories. Interestingly, the
STS region matures late in ontogeny (Paus,
2005), rendering it particularly vulnerable to
on-going early psychosocial stressors. Thus,
one might speculate that childhood maltreat-
ment has an impact on the developing brain,
which might result in STS/STG dysfunction.
Growing up in a malevolent social environment
might hinder adequate learning experience that
is necessary for acquiring cognitive empathy
capacities.
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EMOTIONAL EMPATHY IN BPD
The construct of emotional empathy
(Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972; Eisenberg and
Miller, 1987) describes an observer’s emotional
response to another person’s emotional state.
Only a few attempts have been made to assess
emotional empathy in BPD. Harari et al. (2010)
used the IRI (Davis, 1983) and found that self-
reported affective aspects of empathy (empathic
concern) were slightly increased among BPD
patients compared to non-clinical controls. New
et al. (2012), however, did not find significant
group differences between BPD patients and
non-clinical controls using the same measure.
In contrast, Dziobek et al. (2011) found a trend
toward decreased values in BPD using the IRI
empathic concern scale. Dziobek et al. (2011)
additionally used the more ecologically valid
MET to assess emotional empathy. In the emo-
tional empathy items of the MET, participants
were required to rate the amount of mirroring
of an emotion that took place in response to a
picture (e.g., if the mental state of the person
was anxious, subjects were asked to rate how
anxious they felt) and additionally rated the
degree of empathic concern they felt for the
person in the picture. Results from the MET
revealed that BPD patients had significantly
reduced tendencies to feel empathy for other
people in emotionally distressing situations
compared to non-clinical controls (Dziobek
et al., 2011).
NEUROFUNCTIONAL CORRELATES OF EMOTIONAL
EMPATHY IN BPD
Applying the fMRI version of the MET, Dziobek
et al. (2011) found that during emotional empa-
thy the right mid-insula was more activated in
individuals with BPD than in non-clinical con-
trols. The mid-insula has been shown to react
strongly to bodily states of arousal (Brendel
et al., 2005). Further, Dziobek et al. (2011)
found a positive association between the acti-
vation in the right middle insula and skin
conductance during emotional empathy in indi-
viduals with BPD, which supports the notion
of increased arousal when being emotionally
involved with others. Higher levels of personal
distress and arousal are commonly observed
in individuals with BPD (e.g., Guttman and
Laporte, 2000). Thus, the data of Dziobek et al.
(2011) suggest that arousal might interfere with
emotional empathy in BPD. Other studies with
non-clinical samples support this assumption
by showing that individuals who are able to reg-
ulate their emotions are more likely to experi-
ence concern for others (Eisenberg et al., 1994).
Thus, the deficit in the ability to regulate emo-
tions in BPDmight be directly linked to impair-
ments in emotional empathy.
FACIAL EMOTION EXPRESSION IN BPD
BPD patients are not only recipients but also
emitters of social signals. The emission of
unclear or hard to read social signals might con-
tribute to social dysfunction in BPD. Among
these signals, facial expressions play a major
role in communication (Frith, 2009). Even
unconscious perceptions of facial emotional
expressions can lead to behavioral and emo-
tional contagion in the observer. These per-
ceptions might therefore act as one very basal
mechanism for inferring the mental state of an
interaction partner (Dimberg et al., 2000; Frith,
2009).
To date, only a small number of empirical
studies have examined altered nonverbal expres-
sion in BPD. As illustrated above, Flury et al.
(2008) assessed empathic accuracy in interact-
ing dyads. Their results indicated that thoughts
and feelings of students with high BPD features
are harder to infer compared to their counter-
parts with low BPD features. Moreover, pre-
vious studies have specifically examined facial
emotional expressions in patients with BPD
(Herpertz et al., 2001; Renneberg et al., 2005).
In one study, male criminal offenders with
BPD showed little facial response to pleas-
ant and unpleasant stimuli compared to non-
clinical controls (Herpertz et al., 2001). In
another study, frequency and intensity of facial
emotional expressions in female patients with
BPD were assessed while participants watched
film sequences of positive or negative emo-
tional valence (Renneberg et al., 2005). In line
with the results of Herpertz et al. (2001),
patients with BPD reacted in the same man-
ner as depressed patients, with reduced facial
activity compared to non-clinical controls. A
further argument supporting reduced facial
activity comes from a study by Lobbestael
and Arntz (2010), which found reduced facial
response in BPD patients after presentation
of abuse-related film stimuli compared to
non-clinical and antisocial personality disorder
control groups.
In a recent study, Staebler et al. (2011) used
a social exclusion paradigm to study facial emo-
tion expression in BPD. In a virtual ball tossing
game (Cyberball, for review see Williams, 2007)
that has been shown to induce strong emo-
tional reactivity in BPD (Renneberg et al., 2012),
facial emotion expressions were analyzed apply-
ing the Emotional Facial Action Coding System
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(EMFACS; Ekman et al., 1994). The results
revealed that BPD patients reacted with fewer
positive expressions and with more mixed emo-
tional expressions (two emotional facial expres-
sions at the same time, e.g., anger and sadness)
compared to a non-clinical control group when
socially excluded in the ball tossing game. That
being said, shame—which is a frequent emotion
in BPD (Rüsch et al., 2007) and might likely
have been elicited in the exclusion situations—
was not assessed in the study. EMFACS does
not allow for the measurement of shame, given
that no distinct facial expression has been
described for this complex emotion (c.f., Tracy
and Robins, 2004). This might have confounded
the assessment of mixed emotions. Thus, future
research needs more fine-grained measurement
of mixed basic emotions while also account-
ing for complex self-conscious emotions such
as shame. Nevertheless, the results indicate that
nonverbal signs of facial emotion expression are
deviant in BPD patients compared to controls.
This could play an important role in the dis-
turbed social relationships of patients with BPD,
given that deviant facial expressions represent
unreliable sources for mental state decoding on
the part of their interaction partners.
AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL
COGNITION IN BPD
With regard to the reception of social signs in
individuals with BPD, studies have focused pri-
marily on accuracy or bias in cognitive empathy.
Research on bias in cognitive empathy showed
that although BPD patients generally are able
to make complex intentional attributions about
others, they show systematic negative, malevo-
lent biases. In addition, it was suggested that
their evaluation of others is generally more
extreme. Whereas earlier work on accuracy has
found no deficits in cognitive empathy, more
recent work using more ecologically valid and
complex stimuli has shown that BPD patients
have subtle deficits in the ability to infer the
emotions, thoughts, and intentions of others
(Minzenberg et al., 2006; Dyck et al., 2009;
Preißler et al., 2010; Dziobek et al., 2011). High
arousal might additionally interfere with BPD
patients’ ability for cognitive empathy (Sharp
et al., 2011). Furthermore, comorbid PTSD
FIGURE 1 | Possible links between deviant social cognition and deficits in social relatedness in borderline personality disorder (BPD).
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and intrusive symptomatology are related to
deficits in cognitive empathy in BPD (Preißler
et al., 2010). Neurofunctionally, these deficits
are associated with reduced activity in impor-
tant nodes of the cognitive empathy network,
i.e., the STS/STG region and the inferior frontal
gyrus (Dziobek et al., 2011; Mier et al., 2012).
Interestingly, reduced STS/STG activation in
BPD was shown to predict PTSD symptomatol-
ogy (Dziobek et al., 2011). PTSD is caused by the
experience of traumatic events. Preliminary data
indicate that trauma such as sexual abuse by a
known assailant is an additional independent
negative predictor for cognitive empathy in BPD
(Preißler et al., 2010). Thus, these data suggest
that experience of traumatic events and subse-
quent PTSD worsen cognitive empathy capaci-
ties. One can speculate that a negative, traumatic
learning environment hinders the formation of
fully developed cognitive empathy.
BPD involves subtle deficits in the appropri-
ate emotional reaction to another person, i.e.,
emotional empathy (Davis, 1994).Whereas with
more ecologically valid tasks these impairments
were detectable (Dziobek et al., 2011), this was
not the case with less ecologically valid question-
naires (Harari et al., 2010; Dziobek et al., 2011;
New et al., 2012). Neurofunctionally, increased
activation of the medial insula (which negatively
correlates with changes in skin conductance
during an emotional empathy task) suggests
that arousal or distress might interfere with the
capacity of emotional empathy in BPD (Dziobek
et al., 2011).
As senders of social signals, BPD patients
show deviant facial emotional reactions to social
stimuli (Herpertz et al., 2001; Renneberg et al.,
2005). Particularly, aversive social stimuli and
contexts such as social exclusion evoke hard-to-
read, mixed facial emotion expressions in BPD
(Staebler et al., 2011).
Aberrant perception and understanding of
social signals as well as emission of ambiguous,
hard-to-read social signals might significantly
contribute to unstable interpersonal relation-
ships and other related psychopathological fea-
tures in BPD that occur in the context of social
settings. One underlying mechanism seems to
be that BPD-specific processing of social sig-
nals results in increased emotional reactiv-
ity (Koenigsberg, 2010). This in turn might
further impair cognitive, as well as affec-
tive, empathy in BPD (Dziobek et al., 2011;
Sharp et al., 2011). Together with aberrant
facial expressions, the depicted vicious cycle
might lead to interpersonal conflicts that pro-
voke aggressive outbursts, repetitive suicidal
behavior, self-injury, and other BPD-typical
behavior (e.g., Gunderson and Lyons-Ruth,
2008). As a consequence, the sum of those pro-
cesses might lead to impairments in establishing
effective social interactions, provoke repetitive
interpersonal conflicts with significant others,
and lead to difficulties in establishing stable
long-term relationships in BPD (Figure 1).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Deficits in social cognition have been described
in a number of psychiatric disorders (e.g.,
euthymic bipolar patients; Montag et al., 2010;
autism spectrum conditions, Dziobek et al.,
2006; narcissistic personality disorder; Ritter
et al., 2011). It will be an important task
for future research to characterize the specific
aspects of dysfunctional social cognition abili-
ties unique to BPD by, for example, using com-
parative study designs including other disorders
with social dysfunction.
The data we reviewed highlight several social
cognitive impairments in BPD, which are mod-
ulated by personal distress and arousal. To
provide evidence for the specificity of those
findings, further studies need to assess social
cognition under different emotional condi-
tions. Prior research indicates that although
BPD patients might not be more physiolog-
ically reactive to emotional cues in general,
they might show increased emotional vulnera-
bility if borderline-specific themes are addressed
and comorbid PTSD is present (Limberg et al.,
2011). In particular stimuli inducing percep-
tion of rejection or abandonment are able to
elicit arousal and strong negative emotions such
as anger and rage in BPD (Berenson et al.,
2011; Limberg et al., 2011; Renneberg et al.,
2012). Therefore, future studies should use these
stimuli to assess social cognition under vary-
ing arousal and emotional conditions and in
different social contexts.
To date, research on cognitive empathy has
focused on either bias or accuracy. In the
future, study designs should combine both
approaches to gain an integrated understand-
ing of mental state attribution in BPD. Further,
emerging evidence in non-clinical groups has
shown that cognitive empathy depends on
motivation (Ickes, 2011), that is either exter-
nally induced and thus context-dependent (e.g.,
attractiveness of the encounter) or related
to personality characteristics or personality
pathology. Additionally, recent research sug-
gests that non-clinical participants have a well-
calibrated understanding of when they are
accurate in inferring mental states (Kelly and
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Metcalfe, 2011). Thus, assessing metacognitive
awareness of emotional and cognitive empathy
might be relevant to BPD research. Finally, BPD
patients present with high levels of alexithymia.
This associated feature of BPD might have an
impact on emotional and cognitive empathy
(Guttman and Laporte, 2002; New et al., 2012),
which should be accounted for in future study
designs.
Most previous studies of social cognition in
BPD used unidirectional tests (e.g., passively
viewing pictures with facial emotion expres-
sions) with varying levels of ecological validity
to assess individual differences. However, the
hallmark of social interaction is the circular
exchange of social signals between two or more
individuals. Thus, on-line tasks that include
feedback loops between two ormore social part-
ners would be more appropriate to understand
social cognitive processes (c.f., Dziobek, 2012).
Economic exchange games might present
one fruitful approach to analyze bidirectional
social interaction and the potential underly-
ing social-cognitive processes in BPD. In these
games, monetary units are considered proxies of
exchange of social signals. In order to make deci-
sions and predict the counterpart’s behavior,
players have to make inferences about the part-
ner’s intentions. In support of this view, Sally
and Hill (2006) showed that theory of mind
performance is related to cooperation and fair
behavior in economic exchange games. Given
that economic games rarely involve face-to-face
encounters of interaction partners, a further
advantage of these games lies in the fact that
deviant facial expression in BPD would not be
a confounding factor.
Unoka et al. (2009) showed that BPD patients
transferred smaller amount of money units
when playing the role of investor in a multi-
round trust game (for explanation of trust
games see Camerer and Weigelt, 1988) com-
pared to non-clinical controls. In line with
this finding, King-Casas et al. (2008) applied a
multi-round trust game with BPD patients as
trustees and found that investment significantly
decreased in later rounds. Further, BPD patients
(as trustees) offered significantly less reparative
money (so called coaxing) compared to non-
clinical controls, to repair cooperation when
investment was low (King-Casas et al., 2008).
Neurofunctionally, this deficit was related to
deviant activation in the anterior insula (King-
Casas et al., 2008). In summary, the results of
both studies argue for a lack of cooperation,
which might be based on reduced trust in BPD
patients: the patients might infer the intentions
of the partners to be non-cooperative. In con-
trast, a recent economic game study by Franzen
et al. (2011) found that patients with BPD
correctly estimate the fairness of a social part-
ner. Interestingly, in their combination of a
multi-round trust game and simultaneous pre-
sentation of varying emotional facial expres-
sions of the game partners, the authors reported
that while non-clinical controls disregarded the
emotional facial expression of the partners in
order to judge fairness, the BPD patients did
not. Franzen and colleagues interpreted these
results as evidence for enhanced intention read-
ing by the patients with BPD (Franzen et al.,
2011).
In sum, although economic games clearly
represent a promising method for the on-line
assessment of social interaction, their exact con-
tribution to elucidating social cognition in BPD
requires further study.
TREATMENT IMPLICATIONS
The literature reviewed here has several poten-
tial implications for the treatment of BPD.
Given that data point toward deficits in social
cognition that are likely amplified by emo-
tion dysregulation and arousal, psychother-
apeutic interventions designed to improve
emotion regulation might also affect social cog-
nition (e.g., Dialectic Behavior Therapy (DBT);
Linehan, 1993; Systems Training for Emotional
Predictability and Problem Solving (STEPPS);
Blum et al., 2008). This potential causal relation-
ship needs to be explored in future empirical
research with BPD patients.
Further, within the context of clinical work
with BPD patients, the emotions and cogni-
tions of the therapist should not be assumed to
be accurately understood by the patient implic-
itly, but rather should be explicitly expressed.
Additionally, ambiguous emotional expressions,
potentially hampering social interactions in
general, should be taken into account, and if
necessary, they should be explicitly addressed
in single and group psychotherapeutic settings.
Moreover, the therapist should be aware that a
BPD patient’s evaluation of other people has a
tendency to be malevolent and possibly gener-
ally more extreme.
In addition, psychotherapeutic interventions
and trainings for enhancing social cognitive
abilities should be integrated into the treatment
of this patient group, with special respect to
PTSD and traumatic experiences. Although dif-
ferent psychotherapeutic programs such as DBT,
Transference Focused Psychotherapy, Schema
Focused Therapy, Supportive Psychotherapy,
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and Mentalization-Based Therapy, which all
address social cognition in their own ways,
have proven effective in the treatment of BPD
(de Groot et al., 2008), information on their
capacities to improve specific aspects of social
cognition is still lacking.
Aberrations of the opioid, oxytocin, and
vasopressin system have been hypothesized to
contribute to interpersonal disturbance in BPD
and potentially to impaired social cognition in
this population (New and Stanley, 2010; Stanley
and Siever, 2010). Thus, pharmacological inter-
vention might be explored as an additional
approach to improve social cognition capacities
(e.g., Simeon et al., 2011; but see Bartz et al.,
2011).
In summary, patients with BPD display a
specific pattern of disturbance in cognitive and
emotional empathy and expression of social
signals. Given the importance of social cogni-
tion on the part of both the sender and the recip-
ient for maintaining stable interpersonal rela-
tionships and establishing therapeutic alliance,
these deficits should be explored further in
future studies.
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